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IF YOU CAN'T TRUST A FIDUCIARY, WHO CAN YOU
TRUST? USING STATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
COMPEL SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS TO DISCLOSE PRELIMINARY
MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
To prevent the oppression of minority shareholders' of closely held
corporations, 2 courts traditionally have imposed state law fiduciary duties3 on
corporate directors, officers, and majority shareholders (controlling share-
holders) of closely held corporations.4 These state law fiduciary duties require
1. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-
16 (1975) (minority shareholder is shareholder that owns less than fifty percent of total outstanding
corporate stock); BLAcK's LAW DIcTioNARY 900 (5th ed. 1979) (defining minority shareholders).
2. See H. HEN. & J. ALExANDER, LAws oF CoRpoaxrxNS §257, at 695-96 (3d ed. 1983)
(defining closely held corporations as having few shareholders); BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 308
(5th ed. 1979) (same); supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (closely held corporations have
few shareholders, and have no ready market for corporations' stock). Courts define closely held
corporations as corporations with stock held by a small number of shareholders that are active
in business of the corporation. See Brooks v. Wilicuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935) (defining
closely held corporations). Additionally, courts recognize that shareholders of closely held
corporations infrequently buy or sell their stock and that no ready market exists for the sale or
exchange of the stock. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d
505, 511 (1975) (giving judicially recognized characteristics of closely held corporations); infra
notes 85-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue court's decision).
3. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) (fiduciary duty is duty
of good faith and inherent fairness); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, -, 460
P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, - (1969) (assigning fiduciary duty to controlling shareholders
of closely held corporation); H. HEN & J. ALExANDER, supra note 2, §232, at 613 (defining
fiduciary duty). A fiduciary duty exists in any situation in which a person places trust and
confidence in another person's skill and integrity. See Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758, 762 (Okla.
1957) (describing circumstances under which fiduciary duties arise). Courts have determined that
directors and officers of corporations have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.
See, e.g., Columbus Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harris, 127 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir. 1942) (corporate
directors and officers owe fiduciary duty to corporation); Arrigoni v. Adomo, 129 Conn.
673, -; 31 A.2d 32, 35 (1943) (director of corporation is in fiduciary relationship with
shareholders and corporation); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App.
134, -, 108 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1952) (same); H. HiNN & J. ALExANDER, supra note 2, §276,
at 747 (directors of closely held corporations have high fiduciary duty). Additionally, courts have
determined that majority shareholders of a corporation have a duty to deal fairly with minority
shareholders. See Southern Pacific, 250 U.S. at 487-88 (imposing fiduciary duty on majority
shareholders exercising control of corporation); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586,
606 (E.D. Penn. 1941), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 146 F.2d 889 (1944) (same); see also
infra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing imposition of fiduciary duties on controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations).
4. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(imposing trustee fiduciary duty on corporate directors, officers, and majority shareholders in
closely held corporations in matters relating to stock); Levin v. Garfinkle, 540 F. Supp. 1228,
1234 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (officers of closely held corporations have fiduciary duty to shareholders);
Donahue, 367 Mass. at , 328 N.E.2d at 515 (imposing fiduciary partnership duty on
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controlling shareholders of closely held corporations to act with good faith
and fair dealing toward minority shareholders.' Consequently, these fiduciary
duties have deterred controlling shareholders from "freezing out" 6 minority
shareholders of closely held corporations. 7 Historically, one method by which
controlling shareholders have attempted to freeze out minority shareholders
has been to purchase minority shareholders' stock in a closely held corporation
without telling the minority shareholders that the closely held corporation
was negotiating for a merger with another corporation.8 Because the value
of the stock of a "target corporation" 9 can increase greatly during a merger,
concealing the existence of merger negotiations from a minority shareholder
selling his stock can reduce the minority shareholder's profits from the stock
sale.'0 To protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations from
receiving inadequate prices for their stocks, the state fiduciary duties that
courts have imposed on controlling shareholders of closely held corporations
shareholders in closely held corporation); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §240, at 651
(controlling shareholders of closely held corporations must meet high fiduciary duty); Haskell,
The Relationship of Directors of a Close Corporation to its Creditors, 1 Cum. SAn'oRD L. Ray.
209, 209 (1970) (directors of closely held corporation have fiduciary duty to corporation and to
shareholders); infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's imposition of
trustee fiduciary duty on directors, officers, and majority shareholders of closely held corporations
in matters that relate to closely held corporation's stock); infra notes 86-94 and accompanying
text (discussing Donahue court's imposition of partnership fiduciary duty on shareholders of
closely held corporations).
5. See, e.g., Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, , 60 N.W.2d 820, 830
(1953) (controlling shareholders of closely held corporations have duty of good faith and fair
dealing in dealings with minority shareholders); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, - , 5
A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (same); I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §1.15, at 31-32 (1958) (same);
see also supra note 3 (defining fiduciary duty).
6. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPsoN, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS,
§ 1:02, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "freezeouts" as exercises of controlling shareholders' power
to deny minority shareholders profits from their investments or privileges of stock ownership);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (5th ed. 1979) (same); infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text
(describing freezeout methods and strategies).
7. See 2 F. O'NEAL & R. THoMwsoN, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
§ 7:17, at 122-23 (2d ed. 1987) (describing fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders that
provide minority shareholders with basis of relief from freezeouts).
8. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987) (controlling
shareholder can freeze out minority shareholder by purchasing minority shareholder's stock
without disclosing existence of merger negotiations), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988);
Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, -, 220 P.2d 598, 599-600 (1950) (same); Aggatuci
v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, - , 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945) (same).
9. See I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEzEoTJTs § 1.01 [1], at 4 (1987)
(defining "target" corporation as corporation that is object of friendly or unfriendly takeover
bid for merger).
10. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987) (merger of
closely held corporation increased value of plaintiff's stock from $23,500 to $646,000), cert.
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988); infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (explaining how
shareholders of closely held corporations can make large profit by not disclosing corporation's
agreement to merge with another corporation).
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require the controlling shareholders to disclose the existence of merger ne-
gotiations before purchasing minority shareholders' stocks."
11. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (defendant, as director and
majority shareholder, owed stockholders good faith duty to disclose impending sale of corpora-
tion's lands before purchasing stockholders stock); Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, -
,220 P.2d 598, 600-601 (1950) (director violated fiduciary duty to shareholders by buying stock
from shareholder without disclosing possibility that closely held corporation would merge with
another corporation); Aggatuci v. Corradi, 327 111. App. 153, -, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945)
(in special circumstances, such as assured sale of corporation, corporate officers have duty to
disclose assured sale of corporation); infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing
application and rationale of "special circumstances doctrine"). Some courts have adopted the
special circumstances doctrine, which attempts to deter a corporate insider from taking advantage
of a minority shareholder by requiring the corporate insider, before purchasing a minority
shareholder's stock, to inform the minority shareholder that the closely held corporation is
engaging in an assured merger with another corporation. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying
text (discussing special circumstances doctrine). Other courts have adopted the "minority rule,"
which requires a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation to disclose not only the
existence of assured merger negotiations, but also the existence of any preliminary merger
negotiations to a minority shareholder before purchasing the minority shareholder's stock. See
Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, -, 492 P.2d 43, 45-46 (1972) (because
directors of closely held corporations owe fiduciary duty to both corporation and shareholders,
director had duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations to minority shareholder before
purchasing stock); infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing minority rule).
In addition to actions for breach of fiduciary duties under state law, a shareholder also may
bring an action under the Securities & Exchange Commission's rule lOb-5 (rule lOb-5) to recover
damages from an individual or corporation that fails to announce to the minority shareholder
before purchasing the minority shareholder's stock that the corporation will merge with another
corporation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (prohibiting corporations' false or misleading
statements or omissions concerning assured merger negotiations); H. HENN & J. AL~xEaDR,
supra note 2, §298, at 824-29 (discussing rule lOb-5). But see Ewell, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to
Disclose Merger Negotiations in Corporate Statements, 96 YA.LE L.J. 547, 548-54 (1987) (rule
lOb-5 does not require corporation to disclose existence of preliminary merger negotiations). For
a shareholder to bring an action under rule lOb-5, the shareholder must establish that the merging
corporation had settled on the price and structure of the merger but had failed to disclose the
merger to the shareholder before purchasing the shareholder's stock. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1987). See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir.) (once corporation
reaches fundamental agreement on price and structure of merger, corporation has duty to disclose
merger to shareholders), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); Reiss v. Pan American Airways,
Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204-07 (3rd
Cir. 1982) (same); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Courts call the duty that the corporation has
to disclose the existence of merger negotiations to shareholders once the corporation reaches an
agreement on the price and structure of the merger the "price structure rule." See Flamm, 814
F.2d at 1174-75 (defining price structure rule). Recently, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit leniently applied the price structure rule in dealings in closely
held corporations. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434-35 (7th Cir. 1987)
(although closely held corporation had not reached agreement on price and structure of merger,
corporation could have duty to disclose to shareholders existence of preliminary merger negotia-
tions), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1195-96
(7th Cir. 1985) (same). The Seventh Circuit in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps determined that rule
lOb-5 could require a closely held corporation to disclose preliminary merger negotiations. See
Jordan, 815 F.2d at 434-35 (price structure rule may be inappropriate for closely held corpora-
tions); Michaels, 767 F.2d at 1195-96 (same); see also Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and
the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1473,
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Although the fiduciary duties that some courts impose on controlling
shareholders purchasing stock from minority shareholders during merger
negotiations help deter freezeouts, these fiduciary duties have provided incom-
plete protection to minority shareholders of closely held corporations.' 2 Tra-
ditionally, to comply with state fiduciary duties, courts have not necessarily
required controlling shareholders purchasing minority shareholders' stock to
disclose merger negotiations that merely are preliminary and not yet final or
assured (preliminary merger negotiations)." Furthermore, courts imposing
state fiduciary duties may not require controlling shareholders of closely held
1545-46 (1986) (explaining application of rule lOb-5 to closely held corporations); Note, A New
Approach to Rule J0b-5: Distinguishing the Close Corporation, 1978 WAsH. U.L.Q. 733, 750
(same).
Although rule 10b-5 creates fiduciary duties, minority shareholders of closely held corpora-
tions often may more easily bring an action under state fiduciary duties than under rule lOb-5.
See Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1174-75 (if corporation reaches fundamental agreement on price and
structure of merger, corporation has duty to disclose merger to shareholders); supra notes 41-59
and accompanying text (some state fiduciary duties could require corporations or controlling
shareholders to disclose existence of preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing minority
shareholder's stock). Unlike rule lOb-5, state fiduciary duties may require a corporation to disclose
to a minority shareholder the existence of merger negotiations before purchasing the minority
shareholder's stock, even though the merger negotiations are preliminary and not yet assured
under the l0b-5 price structure rule. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discussing
state fiduciary duties that could require controlling shareholders or corporation to disclose existence
of preliminary merger negotiations to minority shareholder before purchasing minority share-
holder's stock). Shareholders of a closely held corporation, therefore, more easily might prevail
in a suit claiming that a corporation's failure to disclose preliminary merger negotiations violated
state fiduciary duties than in a suit claiming that the corporation's failure to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations violated rule lOb-5. Id.
12. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete protection from
freezeouts that many states' fiduciary duties afford minority shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations).
13. See Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, _, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945) (under
special circumstances doctrine, controlling shareholders of closely held corporations only have
duty to disclose existence of assured sale of corporation to minority shareholder if purchasing
minority shareholder's stock); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REv. 271, 291-93 (1986) (discussing fiduciary duty that closely held corporations have
to disclose preliminary merger negotiations); infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing
basis of special circumstances doctrine). The terms "final merger negotiations" and "assured
merger negotiations" pertain to violations of federal disclosure laws under rule lob-5 as well as
to violations of state fiduciary duties. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) (prohibiting corporations'
false or misleading statements or omissions concerning assured merger negotiations); see also
Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir.) (explaining price structure method of
determining whether negotiations are assured), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987); Reiss v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d
1196, 1204-07 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); supra note 11 (discussing rule lOb-5). State courts' definitions
of preliminary merger negotiations and assured merger negotiations are not as specific or structured
as the definitions of preliminary and assured merger negotiations that federal courts use in
interpreting rule 10b-5. See Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Il1. App.
134, -, 108 N.E.2d 493, 495-97 (1952) (before applying special circumstances doctrine, court
used no formal test to make factual determination that sale of corporation was assured); Agatucci,
327 Ill. App. at __ , 63 N.E.2d at 632 (same); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504,
202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925) (same).
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corporations to disclose the existence of preliminary merger negotiations if
the controlling shareholder is purchasing a minority shareholder's stock in an
individual capacity and not for the corporation.' 4 By applying a fiduciary
duty that requires controlling shareholders to disclose both preliminary and
assured merger negotiations to minority shareholders before purchasing the
minority shareholders' stocks, regardless of the capacity in which the share-
holder is acting, courts more completely would protect minority shareholders
in closely held corporations from freezeouts.
5
I. D nEFING CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
In imposing fiduciary duties on shareholders of closely held corporations,
courts necessarily have distinguished closely held corporations from publicly
held corporations. 6 Courts distinguish closely held corporations from publicly
held corporations by recognizing that, although publicly held corporations
may have an unlimited number of shareholders,' 7 closely held corporations
only have a few shareholders. 8 Furthermore, courts recognize that, unlike
public corporations, most closely held corporations integrate corporate man-
agement and corporate ownership. 9 The shareholders of closely held corpo-
14. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing rules that only address
shareholder purchasing stock on his own behalf from minority shareholder). But see Guy v.
Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (imposing trustee fiduciary
duty on controlling shareholder of closely held corporation purchasing stock from minority
shareholder on behalf of corporation that requires controlling shareholders to disclose existence
of preliminary merger negotiations); infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing Guy
court's decision).
15. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete protection from
freezeouts that courts that distinguish between shareholders acting in individual capacity and in
corporate capacity afford shareholders of closely held corporations); infra notes 67-83 and
accompanying text (explaining protection that courts could afford minority shareholders of closely
held corporations by imposing same fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders acting in corporate
capacity and controlling shareholders acting in individual capacity).
16. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (defining closely held corporations).
17. H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §257, at 695-96 (contrasting between closely
held corporations and publicly held corporations).
18. See, e.g., Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935) (closely held corporation
is corporation with few number of shareholders); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (same); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law,
33 CoRNr. L. Q. 488, 491 (1948) (same); supra note 2 (defining closely held corporations).
Under courts' liberal definitions of closely held corporations, the vast majority of corporations
are closely held corporations. See H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §257, at 695 (large
majority of corporations are closely held corporations); 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THoMPsoN, supra
note 6, § 1:01, at 2 n.1. (same). Even though closely held corporations consist of only a small
number of shareholders, closely held corporations may have vast assets and international
operations. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 5, § 1.03, at 5 (noting that Ford Motor Company was
closely held corporation until going public in 1955).
19. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505,
511 (1975) (closely held corporations integrate ownership and management); 1 F. O'NaL, supra
note 5, § 1.02, at 2-5 (in closely held corporations, most shareholders also manage corporation);
Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U.
19881 1223
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rations typically are also the employees, directors, and officers of the
corporation. 20 Additionally, the shareholders in closely held corporations
usually are friends or family relations. 2' Consequently, the formal corporate
titles in closely held corporations largely are nominal, and the distinctions
between corporate functions may be nonexistent.22 Finally, courts acknowledge
that, because closely held corporations have a small number of shareholders
and the shareholders have personal interests in the corporations, shareholders
in closely held corporations have no ready market for the sale or transfer of
their stock. 23 As a result, controlling shareholders of closely held corporations
have substantial opportunities to freeze out minority shareholders in closely
held corporations. 24
Freezeout tactics deny minority shareholders the privileges that are in-
herent in owning stock in closely held corporations? Controlling shareholders
may freeze out minority shareholders by refusing to declare dividends, by
refusing to employ the minority shareholders, or by awarding themselves
excessive bonuses and salaries.? The characteristics of closely held corpora-
Cm. L. REv. 778, 778 (1952) (management and ownership in closely held corporations essentially
are identical); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §257, at 695-96 (contrasting between
closely held corporations and publicly held corporations).
20. See C. IsRaE.s, CoRPomE PRACTICE 48-49 (1963) (duties of directors, officers, and
managers in closely held corporations may be difficult to distinguish); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note
5, § 1.07, at 13 (most shareholders of closely held corporations usually serve as officers or
directors).
21. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 274-77 (shareholders, directors, and
officers of closely held corporations frequently are friends and family); Kramer, Foreword to
Symposium on Close Corporations, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 433, 433 (1953) (shareholders of
closely held corporations typically are friends and family); Annotation, Duty and Liability of
Closely Held Corporation, Its Directors, or Majority Shareholders, In Acquiring Stock of Minority
Shareholder, 7 A.L.R.3D 500, 502 (1966) (same).
22. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (explaining informal nature of management
that typically exists in closely held corporations).
23. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, _, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-
16 (1975) (typically, shareholders of closely held corporations do not have ready market for sale
of stock); I F. 0' NEaL, supra note 5, § 1.02, at 3 (shareholders of closely held corporations
rarely buy or sell closely held corporation's stock); infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text
(discussing Donahue court's decision).
24. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, - , 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-
14 (1975) (susceptibility of minority shareholders of closely held corporations to freeze out devices
is manifest in nature of closely held corporations); Comment, Close Corporations - Stockholders'
Duty of "Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty" Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close
Corporation Its Own Shares to Cause the Corporation to Offer to Purchase a Ratable Number
of Shares from Minority - Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 89 HAgv. L. REv. 423, 428 (1975)
(same); infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue decision).
25. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 5, § 8.07, at 105 (explaining objectives of freezeouts);
infra note 26 and accompanying text (describing various freezeout tactics). The causes of freezeout
tactics are numerous. See 1 F. O'NEA & R. THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 2:01, at 2 (listing causes
of freezeout tactics). Although the primary motivations for freezeout tactics are greed and power,
other factors, like personality conflicts, family disputes, or changes in corporate philosophies
also may motivate controlling shareholders to exercise freezeout techniques. Id. § 2:02, at 2-5
(same).
26. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, _, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-
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tions facilitate freezeout techniques because a few shareholders can collude
to control a closely held orporation's policies and daily operations concerning
corporate mergers, dividend distributions, and stock purchases. 27 If majority
shareholders collude against minority shareholders, minority shareholders may
have no control over the corporation or their personal investments in the
closely held corporation.2 Moreover, because of the absence of a ready
market for the sale of stock in closely held corporations, minority shareholders
may not be able to profitably surrender their interests in the closely held
corporation. 29 A disgruntled minority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion, therefore, normally has no satisfactory escape from an oppressive
freezeout situation.30
15 (1975) (discussing ways in which majority shareholders, directors, and officers of closely held
corporations can freeze out minority shareholders); 2 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 7,
§ 6:09, at 41-54 (listing various freezeout techniques). Controlling shareholders of a closely held
corporation may freeze out minority shareholders by selling stock to majority shareholders at
lower prices than to minority shareholders, by screening minority shareholders' corporate mail,
and by disregarding and humiliating minority shareholders at corporate functions. See 2 F.
O'NEA & R. THompsoN, supra note 7, § 6:09, at 41-54 (listing various freezeout techniques);
see Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HAiv. L. Rev. 1630, 1630-34 (1961) (describing
merger and consolidation, sale of corporate assets, dissolution, withholding of dividends, and
alterations of voting rights as methods of freezing out minority shareholders).
27. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (because closely held corporations have
limited number of shareholders and integrated maiagement, shareholders easily may collude
against each other). To freeze out a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation, a board
of directors may withhold dividends or other corporate rights from minority shareholders. See
Hayden v. Beane, 293 Mass. 347, -, 199 N.E. 755, 755-56 (1936) (board of directors
withheld voting stock and staged secret meetings to elect board members); Patton v. Nicholas,
154 Tex. 385, 393, 279 S.W.2d 848, 850-51 (1955) (board of directors maliciously withheld
dividends from minority shareholders in closely held corporation). Courts, however, under the
"business judgment rule," prefer not to question the business decisions of directors because
business decisions are the discretionary duty of the director. See, e.g., Perry v.. Perry, 339 Mass.
470, 479, 160 N.E.2d 97, 102-03 (1959) (under business judgment rule, director has complete
discretion in matters relating to dividends, limited only by requirement that director not act in
bad faith); Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 402, 53 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1944)
(same); 1 F. O'NAL & R. THOmPSON, supra note 5, § 3.03, at 4-7 (business judgment rule
promotes corporate directors' and officers' use of freezeout techniques in closely held corpora-
tions).
28. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1964) (unlike shareholders
of publicly held corporations, shareholders of closely held corporations often have large percentage
of total personal capital invested in closely held corporation); 1 F. O'NEA, supra note 5, § 1.07,
at 15 (shareholders of closely held corporations often depend on closely held corporation as
principle source of income).
29. See, e.g, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505,
515 (1975) (shareholders of closely held corporations often are unable either profitably to sell
stock of closely held corporation or to find buyer for closely held corporation's stock); Galler
v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965) (same); Page, Setting the Price in a
Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement, 57 MicH. L. REv. 655, 656 (1959) (stockholders in
personal or family businesses often cannot find buyers for stock); see supra note 23 (stocks of
closely held corporations lack marketability).
30. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (describing prohibitive market character-
istics for sale of closely held corporations' stocks).
1988] 1225
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II. DETERIuNG FREEZEOUTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS - STOCK PURCHASES BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS ACTING
ON TmIR OwN BEHALF
To deter controlling shareholders from freezing out minority shareholders,
courts have imposed varying types of state fiduciary duties on controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations.' A controlling shareholder of a
closely held corporation may freeze out a minority shareholder by purchasing
the minority shareholder's stock without disclosing to the minority shareholder
that the corporation has negotiated to merge with another corporation? 2 For
example, a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation who has
knowledge of a merger because of his corporate position, could purchase
stock from a minority shareholder who is unaware of the merger. 3 If the
controlling shareholder purchases the stock for 100,000 dollars, and the value
of the stock increases to 500,000 dollars during or after the merger, the
controlling shareholder effectively has earned a 400,000 dollar profit from
his purchase of the minority shareholder's stock. 34 Although controlling
shareholders effectively can freeze out minority shareholders by purchasing
the minority shareholders' stocks without disclosing the existence of merger
negotiations, courts differ substantially on the degree to which courts should
protect minority shareholders.
31. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing majority rule, special circum-
stances doctrine, and minority rule approaches of assigning fiduciary duty to shareholders in
closely held corporation).
32. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7-15 (1983) (during merger, target corporations' stock value increases average
of 20%); Langley, SEC To Require Disclosure Talks, Wall St. J., July 9, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (if
corporation discloses merger negotiations, stock prices of target corporations may increase to the
price that acquiring corporation is offering for stock). Because the value of stock increases during
or after a merger, concealing the existence of merger negotiations from minority shareholders
can be very profitable to controlling shareholders of closely held corporations. See, e.g., Guy v.
Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1088-89 (N.D. Il1. 1987) (closely held corporation's
stock value drastically increased shortly after corporation purchased stock from minority share-
holder without disclosing existence of preliminary merger negotiations); Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal.
App. 2d 447, - , 220 P.2d 598, 599 (1950) (same); Aggatuci v. Corradi, 327 IN. App. 153,
, 63 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1945) (value of stock, which controlling shareholder acting in personal
capacity purchased from minority shareholder for $7,000 without disclosing existence of prelim-
inary merger negotiations, increased in value to $13,333 during merger); supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision).
33. See Aggatuci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, -, 63 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1945)
(controlling shareholder earned approximately $6300 by not disclosing existence of preliminary
merger negotiations before purchasing minority shareholder's stock); supra note 32 (explaining
that stock value dramatically may increase during and after merger).
34. See Aggatuci, 327 II1. App. at -, 63 N.E.2d at 631 (controlling shareholder acting
in personal capacity earned approximately $6300 by not disclosing existence of preliminary merger
negotiations); supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing profits that corporations and
controlling shareholders can earn by failing to disclose preliminary merger negotiations).
35. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing different fiduciary duties that
majority rule, special circumstances doctrine, and minority rule impose).
1226
PRELIMINAR Y MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
If the controlling shareholder is purchasing the minority shareholder's
stock for his own benefit and not for the closely held corporation, some
courts give virtually no protection to the minority shareholder? 6 Under the
"majority rule," controlling shareholders of closely held corporations do not
have to disclose to minority shareholders the existence of either preliminary
or assured merger negotiations before the controlling shareholder can pur-
chase, on his own behalf, the minority shareholder's stock.37 Courts adopting
the majority rule reason that a minority shareholder of a closely held
corporation has the ability to examine the closely held corporation's affairs
before deciding to sell his stock to a controlling shareholder. 8 Under the
majority rule, therefore, a controlling shareholder who wants to purchase a
minority shareholder's stock has no duty to reveal the closely held corpora-
tion's financial status to the minority shareholder.3 9
Although several courts have adopted the majority rule, the majority rule
is harsh because the rule allows controlling shareholders to conceal the
existence of merger negotiations and to freeze out a minority shareholder by
purchasing the minority shareholder's stock at a price below the stock's true
market value.4°
Because of the harshness of the majority rule, many courts have qualified
the majority rule by adopting the "special circumstances doctrine." '4' The
36. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for fiduciary duties
that majority rule and special circumstances doctrine impose).
37. See, e.g., Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., 152 F.2d 153, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1945) (under
Oklahoma's majority rule, officers or directors of corporation are not trustees of shareholders
with respect to stock purchases and, therefore, are under no duty to disclose preliminary merger
negotiations to minority shareholders before purchasing stock); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich.
504, - , 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925) (following majority rule that corporate directors, if
purchasing shareholders' stock, are not in fiduciary relationship with shareholders); Crowell v.
Jackson, 53 N.J.L. 656, -, 23 A. 426, 427 (1891) (same). Under the majority rule, a director
or officer of a closely held corporation owes no fiduciary duty to a shareholder in transactions
involving the corporation's stock. See H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §239, at 646 &
n.4 (discussing majority rule).
38. See, e.g., Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, -, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925)
(reasoning that all shareholders can examine corporate books before selling their stock); Bollstrom
v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, -, 175 N.W. 492, 496 (1919) (same); 3A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA O1: TH LAW OF PRrVATE CORPORATIONS § 1168.1, at 382 (rev. perm. ed.
1986) (same).
39. See, e.g., Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 212 F. Supp. 482, 582-83 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
(majority shareholder, under Illinois law, has no fiduciary duty to minority shareholders to
disclose all pertinent facts because corporate books are open for minority shareholders' exami-
nation), aff'd, 327 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1964); Anderson v. Lloyd, 64 Idaho 768, -, 139 P.2d
244, 250 (1943) (same); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 38, § 1171, at 394 (same).
40. See Anderson v. Lloyd, 64 Idaho 768, -, 139 P.2d 244, 245 (1943) (majority rule
did not prohibit majority shareholder of closely held corporation from purchasing minority
shareholder's stock at less than half of stock's true value without disclosing existence of merger
negotiations); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2 §239, at 646 n.4 (discussing harshness of
majority rule).
41. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing special circumstances doctrine);
supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing harshness of majority rule). Because of the
1988] 1227
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1219
special circumstances doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty on controlling share-
holders in a closely held corporation who are acting on their own behalf to
disclose to the minority shareholder the existence of merger negotiations
before purchasing a minority shareholder's stock.4 2 Unlike courts adopting
the majority rule, courts adopting the special circumstances doctrine reason
that much of the information that the controlling shareholder possesses is
not available to a minority shareholder who wants to investigate the value of
the closely held corporation's stock.43 Courts that have adopted the special
circumstances doctrine, however, have limited the doctrine to require a
controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation to disclose only an
assured merger to a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation before
purchasing the minority shareholder's stock. 44 Under the special circumstances
doctrine, therefore, a controlling shareholder, before purchasing a minority
shareholder's stock, may not have to disclose to the minority shareholder the
existence of merely preliminary merger negotiations.45
harshness of the majority rule, few courts have applied the rule in its pure form in the last 75
years. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2 §239, at 646 n.4 (discussing harshness of majority
rule). Most jurisdictions that follow the majority rule have modified the rule under the "special
circumstances doctrine." Id.; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing special
circumstances doctrine).
42. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2 §239, at 647 (defining special circumstances
doctrine). See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, - (1909) (before purchasing stockholder's
stock, defendant, as director and majority shareholder, owed stockholder good faith duty to
disclose impending sale of corporation's lands); Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, - ,
220 P.2d 598, 601 (1950) (director violated fiduciary duty to shareholder by buying stock from
shareholder without disclosing possibility that corporation would be sold); Aggatuci v. Corradi,
327 Il. App. 153, - , 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945) (assured sale of corporation is special
circumstance that requires controlling shareholders to disclose to minority shareholder existence
of assured sale before purchasing minority shareholder's stock). Under the traditional majority
rule, a controlling shareholder has no duty to disclose information to persons from whom the
controlling shareholder buys and sells stock. See Aggatuci, 327 Ill. App. at - , 63 N.E.2d at
632 (stating majority rule); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, - , 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925)
(same). If the controlling shareholder purchases stock from a minority shareholder during an
assured merger, however, a special circumstance exists that requires the controlling shareholder
to disclose the corporation's assured merger to the minority shareholder. See Aggatuci, 327 Ill.
App. at - , 63 N.E.2d at 632 (explaining special circumstances doctrine).
43. See, e.g., Aggatuci, 327 Ill. App. at - , 63 N.E.2d at 632 (explaining that
unavailability of information from corporate books, including existence of merger negotiations,
is basis for special circumstances exception to majority rule); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504,
- , 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925) (same); 3A W. F.ETCHER, supra note 38, § 1171, at 394
(same); supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (same).
44. See, e.g., James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R. Co., 264
F.2d 445, 450-52 (7th Cir.) (if purchasing stock, controlling shareholders have no duty to disclose
negotiations for sale of corporate land to minority shareholders because sale of land was not
final), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Agalucci, 327 II. App. at - , 63 N.E.2d at 632
(officers have duty to disclose special circumstances, such as assured sale of corporation, to
minority shareholder if purchasing minority shareholder's stock); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich.
504, - , 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925) (recognizing that special circumstances doctrine does not
require controlling shareholders of closely held corporations to disclose merger negotiations to
minority shareholders before purchasing stock if merger is not assured).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining that special circumstances doctrine
only might apply to assured mergers, not preliminary mergers).
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As an alternative to the majority rule and special circumstances doctrine,
some courts have adopted the "minority rule," which assumes that a con-
trolling shareholder of a closely held corporation is in a trustee relationship
with the other shareholders in matters concerning corporate stock. 46 The
trustee fiduciary duty requires controlling shareholders of a closely held
corporation to act under a duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect
to the stock.47 Under the minority rule, therefore, a controlling shareholder,
before purchasing a minority shareholder's stock for himself, must disclose
any information that would increase the value of the corporate stock.4 8 The
minority rule, in contrast to the majority rule and special circumstances
doctrine, requires a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation to
disclose the existence of preliminary merger negotiations to a minority share-
holder before purchasing the minority shareholder's stock for his own bene-
fit.49
46. See, e.g., Logan v. Arnold, 82 Fla. 237, -, 89 So. 551, - (1921) (officer of
corporation owed shareholder trustee fiduciary duty to disclose financial condition of corporation
before purchasing minority shareholder's stock, even if books of corporation revealed financial
condition); Bettendorf v. Bettendorf, 190 Iowa 83, -, 179 N.W. 444, 456 (same), supp. op.,
179 N.W. 945 (1920); see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, §239, at 648 (defining
minority rule); 3A W. FaTicHER, supra note 38, § 1168.2, at 388 (under minority rule, controlling
shareholders are trustees of minority shareholders stock).
47. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 322-23 (5th
Cir.) (under Louisiana law, corporate officers had duty to all shareholders to deal in atmosphere
of trust and confidence and disclose any superior knowledge to shareholders before purchasing
shareholder's stock), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co.,
94 Idaho 504, - , 492 P.2d 43, 45-46 (1972) (because directors of closely held corporations
owe fiduciary duty to both corporation and shareholders, director had duty to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations to minority shareholder before purchasing stock); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249
S.C. 577, - , 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967) (officers and directors of closely held corporations
always owe fiduciary duty to shareholders).
48. See Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, -, 492 P.2d 43, 45-46
(1972) (because preliminary negotiations enhance value of stock, directors of closely held cor-
porations owe fiduciary duty to disclose to minority shareholder existence of preliminary merger
negotiations before purchasing minority shareholder's stock); Blakesley v. Johnson, 227 Kan.
495, - , 608 P.2d 908, 914 (1980) (controlling shareholder of closely held corporation has
strict fiduciary duty to disclose any information affecting value of stocks to minority shareholder
before conducting any dealings concerning corporation's stock); see also supra note 32 and
accompanying text (explaining that value of stock of target corporation greatly increases during
merger).
49. Compare Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, -, 492 P.2d 43,
45-46 (1972) (under minority rule, director of closely held corporation has duty to disclose
preliminary merger negotiations to minority shareholder before purchasing stock) and Jacobson
v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, -, 155 S.E.2d 601, 604-06 (1967) (same) with supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text (under majority rule, controlling shareholders of closely held corporations
have no duty to disclose assured merger negotiations or preliminary merger negotiations to
minority shareholders before purchasing stock) and supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text
(under special circumstances doctrine, controlling shareholders of closely held corporations only
have duty to disclose assured merger negotiations to minority shareholders before purchasing
stock).
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III. DETERRING FREEZEOUTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS- STOCK PURCHASES BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS BEHALF
OF THE CORPORATION
Although the majority rule, special circumstances doctrine, and minority
rule place different fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders of closely
held corporations who are purchasing the stock on their own behalf, at least
one court has placed an even stricter duty on controlling shareholders pur-
chasing stock for the corporation. 0 In Guy v. Duff and Phelps, Inc.5' the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered
whether corporate officers, acting in a corporate capacity for a closely held
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to disclose the existence of preliminary
merger negotiations to a minority shareholder before purchasing the minority
shareholder's stock for the corporation. 52 In Guy a corporate officer, acting
on behalf of a closely held corporation, purchased stock from the plaintiff,
a minority shareholder, without informing the plaintiff that the corporation
was conducting preliminary merger negotiations with Security Pacific, Inc.
(Security).5 3 After the corporation purchased the plaintiff's stock, the cor-
poration announced that Security had acquired the corporation's stock for
an amount that greatly exceeded the price per share at which the defendant
corporation had purchased the plaintiff's stock.54 Subsequently, the plaintiff
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, alleging that the defendant, a closely held corporation, owed the
50. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Il1 1987) (imposing
trustee fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders of closely held corporations purchasing stock
from minority shareholders in corporate capacity); supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text
(explaining majority rule, special circumstances doctrine, and minority rule, which refer to
controlling shareholders purchasing stock on their own behalf); infra notes 57-66 and accompa-
nying text (explaining courts' differentiation between controlling shareholders of closely held
corporations acting in individual capacity and corporate capacity); infra notes 51-59 and accom-
panying text (discussing Guy court's decision).
51. 672 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. I. 1987).
52. Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Il1. 1987).
53. Id. at 1088. In Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc. the defendant corporation, Duff & Phelps,
Inc. (Duff & Phelps), was a financial consulting firm. Id. at 1087. The plaintiff, Guy, who was
an employee of the defendant, purchased and owned stock under a stock restriction and purchase
agreement (the Agreement). Id. at 1088. Guy, under the Agreement, had purchased 400 shares
of Duff & Phelp's stock. Id. The Agreement required Guy to sell his shares back to Duff &
Phelps at the stock's book value if Guy resigned or the corporation terminated Guy's employment
for any reason. Id.
In addition to his employment with Duff & Phelps, Guy operated a profitable commodities
trading advising business that had earned approximately $138,000 in 1982 and 1983. Id. Duff &
Phelps gave Guy an ultimatum that, unless Guy discontinued the consulting business, Duff &
Phelps would terminate Guy's employment. Id. Duff & Phelps, however, did not disclose to
Guy that the corporation was negotiating a merger. Id. Guy chose not to discontinue his
consulting business, and Duff & Phelps terminated Guy's employment effective September 1,
1983. Id.
54. Id.
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plaintiff a fiduciary duty to disclose the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations before purchasing the plaintiffs shares.
5
The district court in Guy recognized that, under the special circumstances
doctrine that Illinois follows, a corporate officer acting on his own behalf
has a fiduciary duty to disclose to a minority shareholder an assured sale of
the corporation before purchasing the minority shareholder's stock in the
corporation for his own benefit.5 6 The Guy court, however, recognized that
Illinois distinguishes controlling shareholders acting on their own behalf from
controlling shareholders acting on behalf of the corporation.57 The district
court reasoned that a corporation, before repurchasing any of its outstanding
stock from a minority shareholder, owes a trustee fiduciary duty of good
faith and fair dealing to the minority shareholder to disclose any material
facts to the shareholder that might affect the value of the corporation's
stock .5  Because the preliminary merger negotiations with Security were ma-
terial to the price of the stock, the Guy court concluded that the corporate
officer, acting in a corporate capacity for the closely held corporation, had
a trustee fiduciary duty to disclose to the minority shareholder that the
corporation was conducting preliminary merger negotiations.5 9
Although the Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty is stricter than the
fiduciary duties under the majority rule and the special circumstances doctrine,
the Guy court's fiduciary duty only applies to controlling shareholders who
are purchasing stock for the closely held corporation 0 The Guy court, in
55. Id. at 1087-88. In Guy the plaintiff, Guy, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Duff & Phelps, in purchasing Guy's shares,
had violated a fiduciary duty to Guy by not disclosing that Duff & Phelps might merge with
another corporation. Id. Guy also alleged that Duff & Phelp's failure to disclose the existence
of preliminary merger negotiations to Guy before purchasing Guy's shares of stock constituted
fraud. Id. at 1087. In response, Duff & Phelps maintained that it did not have a fiduciary duty
to disclose to Guy the existence of preliminary merger negotiations and, therefore, moved for
summary judgment. Id. at 1089. Additionally, Duff & Phelps contended that summary judgment
was appropriate because, under the Agreement, the corporation's purchase of the stock was
automatic on Guy's termination, because Duff & Phelps had no intent to deceive Guy, and
because Guy could not show that he had suffered from the corporation's failure to disclose the
existence of preliminary merger negotiations. Id. The district court determined that Guy presented
sufficient evidence that, because Guy had control over the decision to quit the defendant
corporation's employment, Guy's decision to continue the consulting business essentially was the
equivalent of deciding to sell the stock. Id. The district court concluded that, although the
defendant's lack of intent to defraud Guy defeated Guy's fraud claim, intent is not an element
a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id. at 1092. The district court, therefore, denied Duff & Phelp's
motion for summary judgment as to Guy's breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1093.
56. Id. at 1090.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The district court in Guy reasoned that the materiality of the merger negotiations
was a jury question and, consequently, denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as
to Guy's breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id.
60. See id. (corporate officer acting in corporate capacity with respect to minority share-
holder's stock owed minority shareholder fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing); see also
supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's holding that controlling
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imposing a trustee fiduciary duty c n controlling shareholders acting on behalf
of their corporations, reasoned that a closely held corporation is, in effect,
a trustee of the shareholders' stock and, therefore, under the trustee rela-
tionship cannot take monetary advantage of a minority shareholder. 6' The
trustee relationship creates a fiduciary duty in controlling shareholders to
relay to the selling shareholder any information, including the existence of
preliminary merger negotiations, that may increase the value of the selling
shareholder's stock.
62
In contrast to the Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty, courts adopting the
special circumstances doctrine or the majority rule reason that a controlling
shareholder of a closely held corporation acting on his own behalf is not a
trustee of the other shareholders of the closely held corporation, and, there-
fore, the majority rule and special circumstances doctrine do not impose a
trustee fiduciary duty to disclose preliminarymerger negotiations. 6 The mi-
nority rule differs from the Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty because courts
do not apply the minority rule to controlling shareholders purchasing a
minority shareholder's stock for the corporation. 4 Conversely, the Guy court's
shareholder of closely held corporation acting in corporate capacity has trustee fiduciary duty to
disclose to minority shareholder existence of preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing
minority shareholder's stock).
61. Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91; see Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367-68, 45 S.E. 232,
233 (1903) (director or other managing officer of closely held corporation is trustee for individual
shareholders and for corporation); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 I11. App.
134, - , 108 N.E.2d 493, 497-98 (1952) (same); see also 3A W. FLrCMBR, supra note 38,
§1168.2, at 387-88 (trustee relationship between directors and shareholders is basis for minority
rule); supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (same).
62. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, , 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (1975)
(corporation's failure to disclose preliminary merger negotiations to minority shareholder before
purchasing minority shareholder's stock breached trustee fiduciary duty); supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text (under minority rule, trustee fiduciary duty requires controlling shareholders
of closely held corporations, before purchasing stock from minority shareholder, to disclose to
minority shareholder any information that could increase value of stock).
63. See, e.g., Bawden v. Taylor, 254 I11. 464, -, 98 N.E. 941, 942 (1912) (under
majority rule, corporate director may remain silent concerning impending sale of corporation if
purchasing stock from minority shareholder); Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 451,
74 N.E. 445, 447 (1905) (same); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, - , 63 N.E.2d 630,
632 (1945) (under special circumstances doctrine, officers have no duty to disclose existence of
preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing stock from minority shareholders); Voss v.
Lakefront Realty Corp., 48 Il1. App. 3d 56, 66, 365 N.E.2d 347, 355 (1977) (under majority
rule, corporate director may remain silent concerning impending sale of corporation if purchasing
stock from minority shareholder); supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (analyzing special
circumstances doctrine and majority rule).
64. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardware Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir.
1959) (applying minority rule to controlling shareholder acting in personal capacity); Weatherby
v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, - , 492 P.2d 43, 45-46 (1972) (under minority
rule, controlling shareholder could not conceal preliminary merger negotiations to make personal
profit); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, -, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967) (applying minority
rule to controlling shareholder acting in personal capacity); supra notes 60-61 and accompanying
text (stating that Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty applies only to controlling shareholders
purchasing for corporation).
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trustee fiduciary duty does not apply to controlling shareholders of closely
held corporations purchasing a minority shareholder's stock in an individual
capacity. 6 Although the Guy court recognized that state case law differentiates
between corporate directors acting on their own behalf and acting on behalf
of the corporation, the court questioned whether any valid justification existed
for the distinction. 66
IV. EXTENDnG A TRUSTEE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS PURCHASING STOCK FROM IMINORITY SHAREHOLDERS ON
THER OwN BEALF
Even though the Guy court's fiduciary duty sufficiently protects minority
shareholders from receiving an inadequate price for their stock from con-
trolling shareholders purchasing for the corporation, the Guy court fiduciary
duty does not protect minority shareholders against receiving an inadequate
price for their stock from controlling shareholders purchasing the stock for
themselves.67 Courts that impose a trustee fiduciary duty on controlling
shareholders purchasing stock for the corporation, but that do not impose a
trustee fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders purchasing stock on their
own behalf, improperly analyze the distinction between shareholders of closely
held corporations acting in an individual capacity and acting in a corporate
capacity. 6 Because the roles of shareholders in closely held corporations are
not very diversified, the considerations that require shareholders acting for
the corporation to act as fiduciaries for all shareholders should impose the
same trustee fiduciary duty on shareholders acting in a personal capacity.69
65. Compare supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (explaining minority rule's imposition
of trustee duty on controlling shareholder of closely held corporation acting on own behalf) and
supra note 64 and accompanying text (same) with Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (imposing trustee
fiduciary duty on controlling shareholder of closely held corporation acting on behalf of
corporation and dealing in matters concerning corporate stock) and supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision).
66. Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1091. Although the Guy court questioned the propriety of
imposing a stricter fiduciary duty on shareholders acting in an individual capacity than on
shareholders acting in a corporate capacity, the court deferred to state law and imposed the
stricter trustee fiduciary duty on shareholders acting for the corporation. Id.; see Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts should base decisions on state law unless issue
involves United States Constitution or Acts of Congress).
67. Compare supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (explaining that minority rule only
applies to controlling shareholders of closely held corporations acting in individual capacity in
matters relating to minority shareholder's stock) with Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (trustee
fiduciary duty only applies to controlling shareholders of closely held corporations acting in
corporate capacity in matters concerning minority shareholder's stock) and supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision).
68. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text (analyzing propriety of imposing different
duties on controlling shareholder of closely held corporation acting on own behalf and on
controlling shareholder of closely held corporation acting on behalf of corporation).
69. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note -13, at 273-74 (analyzing economic nature and
diverse management structure of closely held corporations); see also infra note 70-83 and
accompanying text (discussing rationale for applying same fiduciary duty to shareholders acting
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In many closely held corporation;, each shareholder normally serves as a
director or a corporate officer. 70 Furthermore, because closely held corpora-
tions have a limited ownership and number of stockholders, any gain or loss
of the corporation substantially benefits or damages the shareholders.7 1 Con-
sequently, a stock purchase by a closely held corporation shortly before a
merger may produce a large windfall for the corporation, the profits of which
only a few shareholders would share.7 2 For example, in a corporation in
which each of five shareholders owns 20 percent of the corporation's stock,
the corporation, by failing to reveal the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations to a minority shareholder, would earn a profit of 400,000 dollars
in purchasing the minority shareholder's stock, of which each of the four
remaining shareholders would receive 100,000 dollars of the profit.7 3 Alter-
natively, if a shareholder acting on his own behalf, by failing to reveal the
existence of preliminary merger negotiation to a minority shareholder of the
corporation, made a profit of 400,000 dollars on the purchase of one of the
shareholder's stock, the shareholder would keep the entire 400,000 dollar
in corporate capacity as to shareholders acting in individual capacity); supra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text (discussing lack of diversity between management and ownership in closely
held corporations).
70. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing integration of management
and ownership in closely held corporations).
71. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (defining closely held corporation as
having limited number of shareholders); infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing how
profits from stock purchase by closely held corporation affect shareholders).
72. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 32, at 7-15 (during merger, target corporations' stock
value increases average of 20 percent); supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (closely held
corporations have few shareholders). If a closely held corporation merges with another corpo-
ration, the value of the closely held corporation's stock significantly increases. See Jensen v.
Ruback, supra note 32, at 7-15 (target corporations' stock value normally increase during merger).
If an acquiring corporation purchases a closely held corporation's stock for an amount that
greatly exceeds the previous value of the closely held corporation's stock, a controlling shareholder
that purchases a minority shareholder's stock in the corporation can liquidate his stock at a large
profit. See Langley, SEC To Require Disclosure Talks, Wall St. J., July 9, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (if
corporation discloses merger negotiations, stock prices of target corporations may increase to the
price that acquiring corporation is offering for stock). A controlling shareholder, by remaining
silent about a merger between the closely held corporation and another corporation, may make
a bargain purchase from an uninformed shareholder of the closely held corporation. Jordan v.
Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987) (value of stock, which corporation
purchased from minority shareholder for $23,225 without disclosing existence of preliminary
merger negotiations, increased in value to 646,000 during merger), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct.
1067 (1988); Aggatuci v. Corradi, 327 Il. App. 153, - , 63 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1945) (value
of stock, which controlling shareholder acting in personal capacity purchased from minority
shareholder for $7,000 without disclosing existence of preliminary merger negotiations, increased
in value to $13,333 during merger).
73. Cf. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1987) (corporation
made approximately $622,000 from purchasing minority shareholder's stock without disclosing
existence of preliminary merger negotiations), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988); supra note
72 and accompanying text (discussing profits that corporations and controlling shareholders can
earn by failing to disclose preliminary merger negotiations).
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profit for himself.74 Consequently, a controlling shareholder, regardless of
whether he purchases stock for the corporation or for himself, could make
a large profit by failing to disclose the existence of preliminary merger
negotiations.75 Given the dynamics of closely held corporations, therefore,
few difference sexist between a controlling shareholder of a closely held
corporation purchasing stock on his own behalf and a controlling shareholder
purchasing stock on a corporation's behalf.7 6 Furthermore, because share-
holders purchasing stock in an individual capacity can make a larger profit
than if purchasing in a corporate capacity, minority shareholders need at
least as much protection against dishonest purchases by shareholders acting
for themselves as against dishonest shareholders purchasing for the corpora-
tion."7
Because minority shareholders who are the subject of a freezeout suffer
the same harm from controlling shareholders purchasing for themselves as
from those purchasing for the corporation, extending the Guy trustee fiduciary
duty to include controlling shareholders purchasing for themselves would
better protect minority shareholders from freezeouts.78 Because courts that
impose a trustee fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders acting for closely
held corporations seek to protect the interests of minority shareholders, the
trustee fiduciary duty also should extend to controlling shareholders of closely
held corporations acting in an individual capacity. 79 By imposing a fiduciary
duty of good faith and fair dealing on a controlling shareholder of a closely
74. See Aggatuci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, -, 63 N.E.2d 630, 631 (1945)
(controlling shareholder acting in personal capacity earned approximately $6,300 by not disclosing
existence of preliminary merger negotiations); supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing
profits that corporations and controlling shareholders can earn by failing to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations).
75. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (explaining financial similarity in closely
held corporations between controlling shareholder making bargain purchase of stock on own
behalf and making bargain purchase on corporation's behalf).
76. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (in closely held corporations, shareholder
may make large profit whether making bargain purchase of stock on own behalf or on
corporation's behalf).
77. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (comparing profits that controlling
shareholders purchasing for themselves and controlling shareholders purchasing for corporation
can earn from not disclosing preliminary merger negotiations).
78. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing how trustee fiduciary duty
safeguards against oppression of minority shareholders in closely held corporations); supra notes
25-30 and accompanying text (discussing effects that freezeout tactics can have on minority'
shareholders of closely held corporations).
79. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. I1. 1987) (corporate
officer purchasing minority shareholder's stock for corporation owed minority shareholder trustee
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing); supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Guy court's rationale for imposing trustee fiduciary duty, with respect to stock, on controlling
shareholder of closely held corporation acting in corporate capacity); supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text (discussing need to protect minority shareholders of closely held corporations
from freezeouts); supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (comparing profits that controlling
shareholders purchasing for themselves and controlling shareholders purchasing for corporation
can earn from not disclosing preliminary merger negotiations).
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held corporation dealing with a minority shareholder, courts would dissuade
the controlling shareholder from effecting the damaging freezeout tactic of
undervaluing the shareholder's stock value in buying out the shareholder. 0
The minority shareholder would have notice of the preliminary merger ne-
gotiations and, consequently, could make an informed decision on the proper
selling price of his stock." If the freezeout was successful, the damage to a
shareholder who receives inadequate value for his stock is the same irrespective
of whether the corporation or another stockholder purchases the minority
shareholder's stock.8 2 If courts do not extend the trustee fiduciary duty to a
controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation acting in a personal
capacity, a controlling shareholder who wants to freeze out other shareholders
of their stocks' true values could avoid the stricter trustee duty that courts
impose on controlling shareholders acting in a corporate capacity merely by
making the purchase in an individual capacity rather than in a corporate
capacity.
3
V. EXTENDING A PARTNERSHIP FIDucIARY DUTY To ALL SHAREHOLDERS OF
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONs
Although the Guy court questioned the justification for distinguishing
between controlling shareholders purchasing for the corporation and pur-
chasing for themselves in disclosing preliminary merger negotiations, several
courts considering other types of freezeout tactics already have eliminated
any distinction between the two situations. 4 These courts sometimes have
80. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (corporate
officer, if dealing with corporate stock in corporate capacity, owes minority shareholder trustee
fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing); supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing
Guy court's rationale for imposing trustee fiduciary duty on controlling shareholder of closely
held corporation purchasing stock in corporate capacity from minority shareholder); see also
supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing corporate freezeout maneuvers).
81. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 32 at 7-15 (during merger, target corporations' stock
value increases average of 20 percent); Langley, SEC To Require Disclosure Talks, Wall St. J.,
July 9, 1985, at 3, col. I (stock prices of target corporations may increase to the price that
acquiring corporation is offering for stock). A minority shareholder who is aware of merger
negotiations could make an informed decision on the true value at which his stock should sell.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing how controlling shareholders can freeze
out minority shareholders by failing to disclose preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing
minority shareholder's stock).
82. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (purchasing minority shareholder's stock
at less than fair market value is potent freezeout tactic).
83. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (analyzing difference in duties that courts
place on shareholders acting in corporate capacity and shareholders acting on own behalf).
84. See, Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1191-1206 (7th Cir. 1985) (controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations have fiduciary duty to disclose existence of preliminary
merger negotiations to minority shareholders before purchasing minority shareholders' stocks),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (in dicta, questioning distinction between controlling shareholders purchasing on
own behalf and controlling shareholders purchasing for corporation); infra note 85 and accom-
panying text (listing decisions that impose partnership fiduciary duty on shareholders of closely
held corporations).
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imposed a broad fiduciary duty on shareholders of closely held corporations
that is the equivalent of the fiduciary duty that partners owe to other
partners.'- For example, recognizing the disadvantaged position of minority
shareholders in closely held corporations, the Supreme Judicial Court for the
State of Massachusetts, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company, 6 consid-
ered whether a closely held corporation must offer minority shareholders the
same stock repurchase offer that the corporation tendered to a majority
shareholder 7 In Donahue, a closely held corporation refused to repurchase
a minority shareholder's stock in the corporation at the same price at which
the corporation had repurchased the shares of the corporation's president.1
8
The minority shareholder brought suit against the controlling shareholder and
the closely held corporation to rescind the corporation's purchase of the
president's stock. 9 The Donahue court recognized that, substantively, closely
held corporations resemble partnerships. 9° The Donahue court reasoned that
because shareholders in closely held corporations typically rely on other
shareholders' skills and judgment, and because the stock in closely held
corporations generally is nontransferable, closely held corporations closely
resemble incorporated partnerships. 9' Accordingly, the Donahue court deter-
mined that because closely held corporations substantively possess the char-
acteristics of partnerships, shareholders of a closely held corporation owe
other shareholders the same fiduciary duty that partners owe other partners. 92
The Donahue court recognized that the partnership fiduciary duty requires
all partners to act toward each other with the utmost good faith and loyalty,
and not to act out of greed or self-interest. 9 Consequently, the Donahue
court determined that because the defendant corporation had not extended
85. See Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-88 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (imposing partnership
fiduciary duty on minority and majority shareholder engaging in stock purchase agreement);
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass 842, - , 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (1976)
(shareholders in closely held corporations have fiduciary duty to other shareholders that resembles
duty that partners owe other partners); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -
,328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (1975); H. HENN & J. ALExANDER, supra note 2, §240, at 655 & n.
23 (listing decisions in which courts have extended partnership fiduciary duty to shareholders in
closely held corporations); infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing courts' extension
of partnership fiduciary duty to shareholders of closely held corporations).
86. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
87. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
88. Id. at _, 328 N.E.2d at 508.
89. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 509. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company the
president of Rodd Electrotype Company (Rodd Company) had named one of the president's
sons as a vice president of Rodd Company, and another son as a corporate director. Id. After
the president retired, Rodd, without the approval of the plaintiff, Donahue, who was a minority
shareholder of Rodd Company, purchased forty-five shares of the president's stock for 800
dollars per share as part of a retirement plan. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 510. Comparatively,
Rodd Company, between 1965 and 1969, had offered only 40 dollars to 200 dollars per share
for the plaintiff's stock. Id. at __ , 328 N.E.2d at 511 n.10.
90. Id. at , 328 N.E.2d at 512.
91. Id. at , 328 N.E.2d at 511.
92. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
93. Id.
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to all shareholders the same purchase price offer that the corporation extended
to the corporation's president, the closely held corporation had violated its
partnership fiduciary duty to its shareholders. 94
Although courts and commentators have questioned to what situations
courts might apply the Donahue partnership fiduciary duty, no courts ever
have applied the Donahue partnership fiduciary duty to require an individual
or corporation to disclose the existence of preliminary or assured merger
negotiations." The reasoning in Guy, however, demonstrates the degree to
94. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 521.
95. See, e.g., Note, Contractual Disclaimer of the Donahue Fiduciary Duty: The Efficacy
of the Anti-Donahue Clause, 26 B.C.L. R v. 1215, 1226-33 (1985) (failing to find any court
decision that extend Donahue partnership fiduciary duty to require disclosure of merger negotia-
tions); Comment, supra note 24, at 431 (questioning how strictly and to what situations courts
would impose broad Donahue partnership fiduciary duty); Comment, Shareholders in a Close
Corporation Owe to One Another Substantially the Same Fiduciary Duty Owed by Partners to
One Another: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 21 Va.. L. R~v. 307, 317 (1975-1976) (same).
Although courts have not determined that the Donahue fiduciary duty applies to situations in
which a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation conceals the existence of preliminary
merger negotiations from a minority shareholder before purchasing the minority shareholder's
stock, courts have extended the Donahue fiduciary duty to numerous other situations. For
example, in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court for the State
of Massachusetts considered whether majority shareholders, by terminating the employment of a
minority shareholder of a closely held corporation, had violated a fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholder. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, - , 353 N.E.2d 657,
659 (1976). In Wilkes the board of directors for the defendant corporation, after disagreeing
with the minority shareholder over business matters, terminated the minority shareholder's
employment with the corporation. Id. at -, 353 N.E.2d at 659-61. Even though the minority
shareholder owned 25 percent of the closely held corporation's stock, the other shareholders did
not reelect the minority shareholder as either a director or an officer of the corporation. Id. The
Wilkes court characterized the board's actions as a freezeout of the minority shareholder and
reasoned that, under Donahue, the shareholders owe the minority shareholder a duty similar to
the fiduciary duty that partners owed other partners. Id. at - , 370 Mass. at 662-63. The
Massachusetts court, therefore, determined that the Donahue fiduciary duty applied to situations
involving the termination of a minority shareholder's employment with a closely held corporation.
Id. The Wilkes court, however, reasoned that if the board of directors of the closely held
corporation had a legitimate business purpose for terminating the minority shareholder's em-
ployment, the corporation would have a valid defense to the minority shareholder's claim that
the defendant had breached its Donahue partnership fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder.
Id. at - , 353 N.E.2d at 663-64. The Wilkes court, however, concluded that the closely held
corporation did not possess a legitimate business purpose for terminating the minority share-
holder's employment and, consequently, determined that the corporation had violated its Donahue
partnership fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder. Id. at -, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
After Wilkes, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Pupecki v. James Madison
Corp., considered whether amajority shareholder, who owned 90 percent of the stock in a closely
held corporation, had a fiduciary duty not to authorize the sale of substantially all of the
corporation's assets for less than the fair market value of those assets. Pupecki v. James Madison
Corp., 376 Mass. 212, -, 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1031-32 (1978). The Pupecki court recognized
that, statutorily, the majority shareholder had the right to effect the sale of the closely held
corporation's assets. Id; see MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 75 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988)
(two-thirds vote of corporate stock is necessary to sell all or substantially all of corporation's
assets). The Pupecki court, however, determined that a majority shareholder, even with a statutory
right to sell the corporate assets, had a partnership fiduciary duty under Donahue to other
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which some courts have gravitated toward the Donahue partnership fiduciary
duty principles in considering whether controlling shareholders of closely held
corporations, acting in either an individual capacity or a corporate capacity,
have a duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations to minority share-
holders before purchasing minority shareholders' stocks. 96 The trustee fidu-
ciary duty that the Guy court adopted substantively is similar to the Donahue
court's partnership fiduciary duty because both duties require controlling
shareholders to act in good faith toward minority shareholders. 97 As a result,
the Donahue partnership fiduciary duty, like the Guy court's trustee fiduciary
duty, should require a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation
acting in either an individual or a corporate capacity to disclose the existence
of preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing a minority shareholder's
stock.98
By extending the Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty to require
the disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations in closely held corporations,
courts would offer greater protection to shareholders than the Guy trustee
fiduciary duty provides. 9 The Donahue partnership fiduciary duty applies to
shareholders to receive an adequate price for the corporation's assets. Pupecki, 376 Mass.
at -, 382 N.E.2d at 1033.
After Pupecki, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,
considered whether a minority shareholder who owned 25 percent of a closely held corporation's
stock violated a fiduciary duty to the majority shareholders of the corporation by consistently
voting against allowing the corporation to declare dividends and preventing the corporation from
declaring dividends. Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, -, 422
N.E.2d 798, 800 (1981). In Smith a corporate charter required that 80 percent of the closely held
corporation's shareholders to approve the corporation'sdeclaration of dividends. Id. at - ,
422 N.E.2d at 791. The Smith court reasoned that, under Donahue, a shareholder's partnership
fiduciary duty applied to acts of minority shareholders as well as to acts of majority shareholders.
Id. at - , 422 N.E.2d at 801-02. The Smith court determined that the minority shareholder
did not have a legitimate business purpose for voting against the corporation's declaration of
dividends and, therefore, concluded that the minority shareholder had violated the Donahue
partnership fiduciary duty. Id. at - , 422 N.E.2d at 803-04.
96. Compare Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(imposing trustee fiduciary duty on shareholders dealing with stock in corporate capacity) and
supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision) with Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (imposing fiduciary
partnership duty on shareholders in closely held corporation) and supra notes 84-94 and accom-
panying text (discussing Donahue court's decision).
97. Compare Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (unposing trustee fiduciary duty of good faith
and fair dealing on shareholders dealing with stock in corporate capacity) and supra notes 50-59
and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision) with Donahue, 367 Mass. at - , 328
N.E.2d at 515-16 (imposing fiduciary partnership duty of utmost good faith on shareholders in
closely held corporation) and supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue
court's decision).
98. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (comparing practical effects of imposing
trustee duty and partnership duty on shareholders of closely held corporations); see also Comment,
supra note 24, at 428 (describing distinction between partnership fiduciary duty and trustee
fiduciary duty as "elusive").
99. See infra notes 100-116 and accompanying text (analyzing advantages of extending
Donahue partnership fiduciary duty to require all shareholders of closely held corporation, before
purchasing another shareholder's stock, to disclose existence of preliminary merger negotiations).
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each shareholder of a closely held corporation, regardless of the shareholder's
corporate office or ownership status."c Unlike the Guy court's duty, the
Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty requires every shareholder of a
closely held corporation to treat every other shareholder as a partner. 101 The
Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty, however, only requires corporate directors,
officers, and majority shareholders of closely held corporations purchasing
stock from a minority shareholder to disclose the existence of preliminary
merger negotiations.' °2 Therefore, although the Guy court's fiduciary duty,
by requiring controlling shareholders to disclose the existence of preliminary
merger negotiations, protects minority shareholders from freezeouts by con-
trolling shareholders, the Guy court's fiduciary duty does not protect con-
trolling shareholders from freezeouts by minority shareholders. 13
Although controlling shareholders normally employ freezeout tactics to
oppress minority shareholders, minority shareholders may employ freezeout
tactics to the disadvantage of controlling shareholders.1 0°4 A minority share-
holder's knowledge of the operations or physical assets of a closely held
corporation may be essential to the operation or profitability of the corpo-
ration. 0 5 A minority shareholder may coerce controlling shareholders to
100. Compare Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, - , 422 N.E.2d
798, 800 (1981) (Donahue partnership fiduciary duty applies to minority shareholders as well as
majority shareholders) and supra note 95 (discussing Smith court's decision) with Guy, 672 F.
Supp. at 1090-91 (imposing trustee fiduciary duty only on controlling shareholders of closely held
corporation) and supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision). See
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) (Donahue
partnership fiduciary duty imposes same fiduciary duty on shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations that partners owe to each other); supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Donahue court's decision).
101. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975) (all shareholders of closely held corporations owe each other same fiduciary duty that
partners owe each other); supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue court's
decision).
102. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (trustee
fiduciary duty only applies to controlling shareholders of closely held corporation purchasing
stock from minority shareholders during preliminary merger negotiations); supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text (explaining Guy court's application of trustee duty to controlling shareholders
of closely held corporations).
103. See Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (imposing trustee fiduciary duty on controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations purchasing stock for corporation from minority share-
holder); supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's decision).
104. See, e.g., Donahue, 367 Mass. at , 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17 (minority shareholders may
harm controlling shareholders by dealing unscrupulously with controlling shareholders); Smith v.
Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, - , 422 N.E.2d 798, 799-801 (1981) (because
closely held corporation's charter required 80% vote of voting shares to approve declaration of
dividends, shareholder of closely held corporation who held 25% of corporation's stock was able
to prevent closely held corporation from declaring dividends); Easter & Fischel, supra note 13,
at 296 (minority shareholders of closely held corporations may paralyze closely held corporation
by refusing to attend meetings and preventing quorums, or by voting negatively on corporate
matters requiring unanimous vote).
105. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at , 328 N.E.2d at 513-15 (shareholders of closely held
corporations depend on each other's skills and abilities); see also 2 F. O'NFA, & R. THOMPSON,
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comply with the minority shareholder's demands by threatening to withdraw
aid and experience from the closely held corporation. 116 Additionally, minority
shareholders may be able to collude and form a majority voting block.1 7 By
forming a majority, the minority shareholders can exercise many of the same
freezeout techniques that controlling shareholders use against minority share-
holders.10s Unlike the Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty, the Donahue part-
nership fiduciary duty would prohibit freezeouts by minority shareholders.'19
For example, because a shareholder's corporate office and ownership status
are irrelevant under the Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty, a minority
shareholder could not conceal the existence of preliminary merger negotiations
to make a bargain purchase of another minority shareholder's stock or a
majority shareholder's stock."0 Similarly, a controlling shareholder of a closely
held corporation could not advantageously conceal the existence of preliminary
merger negotiations to make a profitable purchase of another controlling
shareholder's stock."'
Even though the Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty would require
controlling shareholders of a closely held corporation purchasing stock in
either an individual or corporate capacity to disclose preliminary merger
supra note 7, §6:10, at 54-61 (listing various freezeout techniques that minority shareholders may
use against controlling shareholders).
106. See Dresden v. Willock, 518 F.2d 281, 283-88 (3d Cir. 1975) (because minority
shareholder of closely held corporation was also corporate attorney, corporate director, and
corporate officer, minority shareholder was able to execute agreement that required majority
shareholder to purchase stock at inequitable price); 2 F. O'NEAL AN R. THoMPSON, supra note
7, §6:10, at 54-61 (irreplaceable minority shareholder of closely held corporation may pressure
controlling shareholders into transferring control of closely held corporation to minority share-
holder).
107. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (3d Cir.) (after minority share-
holders of closely held corporation induced majority shareholders to elect minority shareholders
to board of directors, minority shareholders terminated majority shareholders' employment), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); 2 F. O'NEAL & R. THomPsoN, supra note 7, §6:10, at 54-61
(explaining tactics that minority shareholders may use to become controlling shareholders); Axley,
The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 278, 282 (1950) (cumulative voting in
corporations sometimes may allow minority of shareholders to elect majority of board of
directors).
108. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (discussing controlling shareholders'
techniques of freezing out minority shareholders in closely held corporations).
109. Compare Donahue, 367 Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (all shareholders of closely
held corporations owe partnership fiduciary duty to each other, regardiess of corporate office or
ownership status) and supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue court's
decision) with Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090-91 (imposing trustee fiduciary duty on controlling
shareholders of closely held corporations purchasing stock for corporation from minority share-
holder) and supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing Guy decision).
110. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at - , 328 N.E.2d at 515 (regardless of corporate office
or ownership status, all shareholders of closely held corporations owe partnership fiduciary duty
to other shareholders); supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (discussing Donahue court's
decision).
11. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at - , 328 N.E.2d at 515 (shareholders of closely held
corporation owe partnership fiduciary duty to each other); supra notes 85-94 and accompanying
text (discussing Donahue court's decision).
1988] 1241
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1219
negotiations, no courts yet have applied the Donahue court's partnership
fiduciary duty to require shareholders of closely held corporations to disclose
any type of merger negotiations."12 Furthermore, no courts yet have applied
the Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty to controlling shareholders of closely
held corporations acting in an individual capacity." 3 By imposing the Guy
trustee duty on controlling shareholders of closely held corporations acting
in either a corporate capacity or an individual capacity, however, courts
would deter majority shareholders from oppressing minority shareholders
better than imposing a trustee fiduciary duty only on shareholders acting in
a corporate capacity." 4 Moreover, in addition to the protection that the Guy
court's trustee fiduciary duty would offer, the Donahue court's partnership
fiduciary duty would protect all shareholders of closely held corporations
irrespective of whether a shareholder is a director, officer, majority share-
holder, or minority shareholder.11 5 By imposing the Donahue court's partner-
ship fiduciary duty on shareholders of closely held corporations, courts
effectively would deter all shareholders in closely held corporations, rather
than just controlling shareholders, from refusing to disclose the existence of
preliminary merger negotiations and from freezing out other shareholders."
6
VI. CONCLUSION
In Guy the Illinois court recognized that the purpose of fiduciary duties
is to prohibit persons from violating relationships of trust and confidence."
7
To further this purpose, the Guy court, in dicta, implied that controlling
shareholders, regardless of the capacity in which they are acting, should have
to disclose to minority shareholders the existence of preliminary merger
112. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing failure of courts to extend
Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty to require shareholders in closely held corporations
to disclose merger negotiations).
113. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing Guy court's application of
trustee fiduciary duty to closely held corporation's controlling shareholders acting on behalf of
closely held corporation in matters relating to closely held corporation's stock); supra note 95
and accompanying text (discussing line of cases extending Donahue court's partnership fiduciary
duty to various situations).
114. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing effects of freezeout tactics on
minority shareholders of closely held corporations); supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text
(analyzing advantages of imposing Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty on shareholders purchasing
stock in individual capacity).
115. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of imposing
Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty to require shareholders of closely held corporations
to disclose existence of preliminary merger negotiations before purchasing another shareholder's
stock).
116. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text (discussing complete protection against
freezeouts that courts would afford shareholders if courts, under the Donahue partnership
fiduciary duty, required shareholders of closely held corporations to disclose existence of prelim-
inary merger negotiations before purchasing another shareholder's stock).
117. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (defining fiduciary duties).
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negotiations." 8 Although the Guy court's suggestion would offer minority
shareholders better protection from freezeouts than they currently enjoy,
courts more effectively could protect shareholders from freezeout tactics by
applying the Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty to require any
shareholder to disclose the existence of preliminary merger negotiations before
purchasing any other shareholder's stock in a closely held corporation. 1 9
Because the Donahue court's partnership fiduciary duty protects all share-
holders of closely held corporations regardless of corporate titles or ownership
status, the Donahue court's partnership duty furthers the purpose of fiduciary
duties by requiring all shareholders of closely held corporations to deal fairly
with one another. 20
KEviN LAWSON KELLER
118. See Guy v. Duff & Phelps, 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (N.D. II. 1987) (trustee fiduciary
duty only applies to controlling shareholders of closely held corporation purchasing stock from
minority shareholders during preliminary merger negotiations); supra notes 50-59 and accompa-
nying text (explaining Guy court's application of trustee duty to controlling shareholders of
closely held corporations).
119. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (comparing Donahue court's partnership
fiduciary duty to Guy court's trustee fiduciary duty).
120. See supra notes 84-116 and accompanying text (discussing protection that Donahue
partnership fiduciary duty affords minority shareholders of closely held corporations).
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